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BOOKS REVIEWED
Felix Frankfurter Reminisces. Recorded in Talks With Harlan B. Phillips. Felix
Frankfurter. New York: Reynal & Company. 1960. Pp. ix, 310. $5.75.
Originally designed a half dozen years ago by Dr. Harlan B. Phillips as a tape-
recording for Columbia University's Oral Research Department, my Brother Frank-
furter's random recollections of people, places and things, here, there and everywhere,
yesterday, today and, on occasion, even tomorrow, will strike the fancy of any man
who considers himself a conversationalist, or who simply delights in listening. In fact,
a good listener is what the book needs. It has an autobiographical undercurrent, but
order and chronology, which were neither desired nor attempted, give way to the
vagaries and spontaneity of "discourse, the sweetest banquet of the mind." Felix
Frankfurter is not particularly interested in glancing back, save only as an aid in look-
ing forward.
A taped interview is its basic format, but unlike so many of today's popular inter-
views, it is not the questions which snap and bite, but the answers-the barbs with
which they sometimes bristle are worthy of the sharp mind whose penetrating insights
prompt them. Acidity ad se ("When in Rome . . .") is not their aim, however. They
are highly relevant to the over-all purpose of painting an intimate and nonetheless
accurate portrait of the workings of one of the most brilliant minds of our times. In-
deed, to one who has for a dozen years watched, listened and often participated in itsjoustings not only with the brethren, but with the Bar as well, the book is genuinely
autographic. In fact, not a few of the same random observations and stories about
the hot dogs have been heard in our weekly conferences, and many more brightened
some otherwise darkly solemn days in either F.F.'s or my own chambers.
Apparently the speed and impatience of my Brother Felix's analytical thought
processes, the results of which are so frequently and carefully expressed with 1e motjuste, require a personalized vocabulary when he tentatively plots their course on
paper. Witness the memorandum of his considerations in 1913 on whether to teach
at Harvard: "So far as contact with [industrial relations] problems goes, big think-
ing them out, I can do more thinking at H.L. School, properly tied up with outside
things" (p. 83); and his characterization of some of President Wilson's definition of
his own aspirations as "vague--unthoughtoutly vague, not vague because big" (p. 83).
Let me emphasize that to read it is not merely to visit Harvard, with its accent
and professional manner. Rather, it is a lesson in history and how it is made-learned
from the notes of a fellow who was there. Before you will parade a cast of hundreds
of V.I.P.'s (to F.F. every person is a V.I.P.) from every walk of life. Among them:
Gutzon Borglum, Winston Churchill, Tom Mooney, William Borah, George Bernard
Shaw, William Howard Taft, John L. Sullivan, Theodore Roosevelt and a host of
authors, playwrights, professors, historians, and the like. Then there are stories and
stories often ending with advice so diverse and yet so appropriate that it could only
come from a lifetime of activity, i.e., to the conversationalist: the chief necessity of
repartee is to cover the hole of the moment; to the lawyer: prepare the other fellow's
case as well as he prepares it-usually better; to the politician: a political speech
should be a poster, not an etching; and to Supreme Court Justices: be tall and broad
and have a little bit of a bay window.
Yes, the book is fun-sparkling with humor, with wit and above all good common
sense. It calls to mind an old jingle:
King Solomon and King David led very merry lives
With very many girl friends and very many wives.
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Then old age came a-creeping with very many qualms
And King Solomon wrote the Proverbs.
And King David wrote the Psalms.
Now I don't say that my Brother Frankfurter has bested King Solomon or King David,
but from the first chapter, dealing with P.S. No. 25, where he started school in New
York City, to and through the final chapter on the "Functions of a Judge," the
reminiscences cover as many lessons. One lesson they have taught even Felix. That
it that the word is "rotgut," not "gutrot."l
Tomt C. Cr,%rm*
The Stockholder's Remedy of Corporate Dissolution. James O'Malley Tingle.
Missoula: 1Iontana State University Press. 1959. Pp. 238. $12.00.
Mr. Tingle's book exhibits an acute avareness of the troublesome situations at-
tendant on majority oppression and deadlock in corporations, particularly in close
corporations. The study, which appears to be the first full dress treatment of the
problem, is an outgrowth of the author's doctoral dissertation presented to the Uni-
versity of Michigan School of Law. The author has made a thorough analys and
critique of the subject, including an exhaustive treatment of the relevant statutes and
judicial authorities. But the book is more than a guide through the authorities. Mr.
Tingle vigorously presses for the adoption of proposed legislation-drafts of which
are included in the volume-so as to arm the legislatures with more effective meas-
ures to protect stockholders enmeshed in the circumstances of majority oppression and
deadlock.
Mr. Tingle commendably tries to orient the reader, through an extensive historical
review of the case and statutory authorities, in the deadlock-dissolution situations
both in the United States and England. In the majority oppression circumstance, un-
less there is remedial legislation, the author fears that the courts, "even in the face
of proved incorrigibility," vill continue to apply the "traditional alternatives in
lieu of liquidation." (p. 176.) Accordingly, the author argues that "the problems are
to make liquidation (1) more definite, and (2) less drastic to plaintiffs and perhaps
more drastic to defendants." (pp. 176-77.)
The deadlock problem, as MIr. Tingle is quick to point out, is peculiar to the close
corporation. Indeed, the very nature of a close corporation makes it inherently
susceptible to a deadlock either in the voting of the shares or in the action of its
directors. The author analyzes the theories of liquidation as enunciated by the
courts. He concludes that where the deadlock is complete, i.e., where the directorate
is unalterably evenly divided, the following descriptive standards of liquidation have
been applied by the courts: (1) the partnership analogy; (2) impossibility of
functioning according to corporate processes; (3) piercing the corporate veil; and
(4) commercial failure or loss. (pp. 123-26.) Where the deadlock is not complete, i.e.,
where equal factions of stockholders are divided but the directorate, a majority of
whom represent one faction, hold over, these standards have been applied for liquida-
tion: (1) the partnership analogy; (2) failure of the directorate to represent a
majority of the stockholders; (3) exclusion of the owners of one.half of the voting
1. James P. Hart, former Chancellor of the UniverAity of Texas, called F.F.'s attention
to his error on page 31. However, in view of the subject matter, we can't ray that Homer
has nodded.
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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power from corporate management; and (4) impossibility of functioning according
to corporate processes. (pp. 126-27.)
The author is of the opinion that existing deadlock legislation is "far too am-
biguous" and none suffices to protect the rights of participation of shareholders.
(p. 195.) This is, of course, a point on which reasonable men could differ. The author
proposes that dissolution be provided,
(2) When participation in the executive management of the corporate business is
denied to a plaintiff (or plaintiffs voting continuously as a unit) owning a percentage
of the corporation's stock sufficient to cause a stalemate in an election of directors.
(a) Participation is denied within the meaning of subdivision (2) whenever the
plaintiff or plaintiffs,
(i) are excluded from the executive management of the corporate business;
or
(ii) cannot longer participate therein, under conditions of mutual confidence
and cooperation, with the stockholder (or stockholders voting continuously
as a unit) owning the balance of voting power.
(b) The purpose of subdivision (2) is to afford the plaintiff or plaintiffs a right
to withdraw their investments in a corporation whenever they have been
denied participation in its executive management. Participation is not denied
if an exclusion has been agreed on by the plaintiff or plaintiffs and the other
stockholder or stockholders. An irreconcilable dissension between the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs and the other stockholder or stockholders must underlie a
denial of participation.
(c) Dissolution and liquidation shall be denied if the plaintiff or plaintiffs are
shown to have caused the underlying dissension intending to exclude the
other stockholder or stockholders from the corporate business or otherwise
to injure their investments herein; provided, that dissolution and liquidation
may be ordered even in such a case whenever the court determines that
mutually confident and cooperative joint management is impossible or im-
probable. (p. 196.)
The book is significant in that it could and should serve as a springboard for
further consideration of additional means to obtain flexibility for the close corpora-
tion. New York is making notable advances in this direction. For example, the
proposed new Business Corporation Law' sponsored by the Joint Legislative Com-
mittee To Study Revision of Corporation Laws, makes it clear that dissension be-
tween factions of shareholders which makes continued association unworkable and
the continuance of the corporate business no longer advantageous to the shareholders,
is a ground for dissolution.2 The proposed new statute also authorizes a petition for
dissolution pursuant to a shareholders' agreement. A shareholder may petition for
dissolution at will or on occurrence of a specified event.3
Mr. Tingle's scholarly and practical book should be in the library of every lawyer
dealing with corporate problems; in the library of every state and federal judge.
WILLIAm H. TIMBERS*
BARRY H. GARFINKEL**
1. N.Y. Senate Int. 3124 (1960).
2. N.Y. Senate Int. 3124, § 11.05 (1960).
3. N.Y. Senate Int. 3124, § 11.07 (1960).
* United States District judge, District of Connecticut; Formerly, General Counsel,
United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
** Member of New York Bar; Yale University, LL.B., 1955.
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Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People. Alexander
Meiklejohn. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1960. Pp. xv, 166. $3.50.
In the course of this beautifully written series of earnest talks, essays and letters,
Professor Meiklejohn comes to his own interpretation of "freedom of speech" in
the first amendment. (p. 20.) Writing as I am for a law school publication, I think
it pertinent and not unfair to drop a reminder that the author of this challenging
little book is not a lawyer. His definitions are not those familiar to our professional
ears. He is permanently startled by the absoluteness of the free speech guaranty, its
lack of any qualification or of any exception operative under any circumstance at
all. The Founding Fathers must have been aware of necessities of war and national
danger, yet they established what the author reads with all literalness as an absolute,
unqualified prohibition of any and all abridgements, in any area of freedom of
utterance. He considers unescapable the conclusion that this first amendment term
means literally what it says. But, he reminds himself and us, that every vell-governed
society has the right and duty to protect itself by taking action against certain kinds
of speech (e.g., slanderous, crime-inciting and treasonable). Thus he discovers a
paradox. Absolute is the prohibition against any abridgement of freedom, yet the
Founders knew that abuses of such freedom would certainly be attempted and
certainly could not be tolerated in an orderly society. One of the purposes of his
little book is to solve that puzzle. I doubt that his special solution will be acceptable
to many lawyers.
The author's proposal, stating it most simply, is to limit the character and
coverage of the guaranteed freedom of utterance by confining it in its absoluteness
to discussion of public or, more accurately, political matters. Other types of speech
would, in the Meiklejohn formulation, be protected by the due process clause's
prohibition of deprivation of "liberty" without due process of law. To the ration-
alization of this distinction and the description of possible processes which could
give it effect, a goodly part of this book is devoted. Mr. Justice Holmes' test of
"ciear and present danger"' is rejected, even as subjected to the later-announced
proviso that the excepting danger must be imminent, serious and carry the probability
of really serious injury to the public weal.2 Similarly unacceptable to our author is
the sometimes stated distinction between mere speech ("speech-thought") and
speech which in its setting, purpose and effect amounts to an "act." 3
So Professor Meiklejohn would compromise by appraising first amendment speech
freedom as absolute in its field but he would give it a field so enclosed as to contain
public affairs only. Of course, the more generally accepted view is that the freedom
is not absolute at all but subject to a whole series of limitations necessary in the
public interest (as to, for example, obscenity, incitement to violence or treason,
and "fighting words"-).
One can sympathize historically with the author in his attempt to limit spe.ech
freedom to freedom to speak about public affairs. There is much evidence that at
the time the federal constitution was written the restrictions galling to Americans
were those which silenced critics of government and governors. Apparently, no one
then had it in mind to knock down the existing bars against obscenity, treason and
the like. When the American Revolution broke out there were in Britain's American
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
3. Pp. 39-40.
4. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 563, 572 (1942).
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colonies about one hundred newspapers of one kind or other and suppression of such
periodicals by the royal governors was not unknown. The British Government for a
century had been trying without real success to enforce press licensing laws in
England and had brought criminal prosecutions for libel and sedition. There is no
doubt at all that the first amendment had for its principal purpose the invalidation of
"previous restraints" akin to the abuses of the past, such as suppression of news-
papers in the colonies.5 In Patterson v. Colorado0 when Mr. Justice Holmes wrote
that the main purpose of the first amendment in this respect was " 'to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other govern-
ments . . . . ,-7 he was referring to the silencing of political opinions in the colonies
and elsewhere in the world.
So it is easy to answer this question: What did the first amendment mean to its
authors? Our Revolutionary forbears had not forgotten the monopoly on printing
given by Henry VIII to his favorite, nor the practice of the Tudor and Stuart kings
of controlling printed views through licensing, nor Milton's ringing attack on that
licensing system in his Areopagitica (1644). Patrick Henry shouted his fears that
Congress "might silence the censures of the people." Chief Justice Hughes pointed
out that liberty of the press meant, in the eighteenth century, freedom from govern-
mental licensing, that is, the right to publish without a license that which formerly
could be printed only with one.8 Benjamin Franklin, whose 255th birthday we honor
this year, said that liberty of the press is "the liberty of discussing the propriety of
public measures and public opinions." If anything were to be accomplished thereby,
it would be easy to multiply from historical sources citations and quotations to show
that freedom to express opinions on political or quasi-political questions was all
the Founders had in mind. The Delaware State Constitution adopted in 1792
guaranteed freedom "to every citizen, who undertakes to examine the official
conduct of men acting in a public capacity. . ".."D Earlier, the First Continental
Congress in a Declaration of Rights had described the importance of freedom of the
press, besides advancing truth, science, morality and the arts, as being "its diffusion
of liberal sentiments in the administration of government." Any examination of
state constitutions adopted before the federal charter makes it clear that it was
press freedom as to governmental and political questions that was marked for
protection. In Mattox v. United States,'0 the Supreme Court wrote that the Consti-
tution should be interpreted as securing to individuals the rights their British ancestors
had fought for. Judge Cooley in his monumental treatise wrote that "the evils to
be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the
government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of
public matters as seems absolutely essential. . ... "1 Our constitutional draftsmen
were fully aware that it was political freedom that required free speech and a free
press and that governmental power to choke off political criticism and agitation is
inconsistent with the concept of a democratic state and a free people. They adopted
5. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 717 (1931); Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138,
141 (1922) (dissenting opinion) ; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
6. Supra note 5.
7. Supra note 5, at 462.
8. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
9. Del. Const. of 1792, art. 1, § 5.
10. 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
11. 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed. 1927).
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Blackstone's dictum that "the liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of
a free state. .. ."12
But enough of nostalgia. Time and the courts have broadened the first amend-
ment's speech coverage to include not only utterances nonpolitical 18 but even drama,
fiction and the lowly movies. 14 Recontraction is not to be expected. Attractive as
Mr. Meiklejohn's proposals are, there is insuperable difficulty barring the way from
construing the amendment to mean freedom absolute but in a limited subject-matter
area only. The better view and more practical course is the one advocated by
Professor Gellhorn: "to disregard advocacy and teaching, even though its ultimate
goals may be acts, unless there is imminent danger that unlawful conduct will be
induced.' u 5 The first amendment's protections and power restrictions should be con-
strued sympathetically and usably but still with idealism according with their lofty
purposes.' 6
CHARLES S. DESMOND*
12. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *151-52.
13. See, e.g., Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940).
14. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
15. Gellhorn, American Rights: The Constitution in Action 83-84 (1960).
16. Black, The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy 200 (1960).
* Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals.
